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Introduction
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious
viral disease affecting cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, buffalo
and artiodactylous wildlife species, caused by the FMD
virus (FMDV). It is characterized by fever and vesicles in
mouth, teats and feet. In a susceptible population, mor-
bidity may approach 100%. Growth and productivity are
severely affected due to fever, pain and distress. Although
adult animals generally recover, it frequently causes high
mortality in young animals.
Foot-and-mouth disease has two of the basic criteria
for the inclusion in the List of Diseases of the Word
Organization for Animal Health (OIE): international
spread and significant spread within a naı̈ve population.
According to EMPRES Programme of Food and Agricul-
tural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), FMD is
a typical Transboundary Animal Disease, as it complies
with the three required characteristics: (i) it is of signifi-
cant economic, trade and/or food security importance for
a considerable number of countries; (ii) it can easily
spread to other countries and reach epidemic proportions;
(iii) it requires cooperation between several countries for
its control/management or exclusion (FAO-EMPRES,
2011). For these reasons, it is a major impediment to
international trade in livestock and livestock products.
Currently, 66 of 178 OIE member countries are recog-
nized as free countries, 65 of 66 do not practise vaccina-
tion except 1, where vaccination is practised.
Furthermore, 11 countries have free zones, either with or
without practice of vaccination. Of the 101 remaining
countries, 96 are endemic or have never proved the
absence of FMDV circulation and 5 were free countries
that are at the present suffering re-emergence of FMD.
Therefore, infected countries represent more than 56% of
the total of OIE member countries.
The role of pigs in these FMD episodes was crucial.
Among the 38 immediate notifications made to OIE from
January 2010 to April 2011, there were seven cases in
which pigs were involved. They occurred mainly in East-
ern Asia, affecting China, Chinese Taipei, North Korea,
South Korea and Hong Kong. The objective of this article
is to review the most recent innovations in topics con-
cerning FMD in pigs, particularly focusing on the current
worldwide epidemiological situation and the strategies for
the prevention and control of the disease.
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Summary
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is the paradigm of a transboundary animal
disease. Beyond any doubt, it is the most serious challenge for livestock’s
health. Official Veterinary Services from free countries invest considerable
amount of money to prevent its introduction, whereas those from endemic
countries invest most of their resources in the control of the disease. A very
important volume of scientific production is developed every year in different
aspects of FMD, and for that reason, the current knowledge makes the diagno-
sis of the disease easier to a great extent. However, FMD is still endemic in
about two-thirds of the countries, and periodically re-emergent in several
countries. This paper is a review of recent publications, focusing mainly on
control measures and current world epidemiological situation, emphasizing pri-
marily pigs.
Transboundary and Emerging Diseases
36 ª 2012 Blackwell Verlag GmbH • Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 59 (Suppl. 1) (2012) 36–49
Aetiology
Foot-and-mouth disease is caused by FMDV, which
belongs to the genus Aphthovirus, family Picornaviridae.
There are seven serotypes of FMDV namely, O, A, C,
SAT 1, SAT 2, SAT 3 and Asia 1 (Brown, 2003; Sutmoller
et al., 2003; Grubman and Baxt, 2004; Lubroth et al.,
2006). All serotypes produce indistinguishable clinical
signs, but the immunological response is distinct. Anti-
bodies can be differentiated by various serological tests.
Infection with one serotype does not confer immunity
against another (Alexandersen et al., 2003).
There is a large and indeterminate spectrum of sub-
types and variants that have been recognized. This exten-
sive genetic heterogeneity is considered one of the major
obstacles for the control of FMD by vaccination (Araújo
et al., 2002; Grubman and Baxt, 2004). A substantial part
of the genetic variability observed in the field is expressed
particularly in the capsid proteins VP1, VP2 and VP3
(Haydon et al., 2001). L, 3A and 3B protein coding
regions have also been identified as RNA regions accumu-
lating levels of genetic variation among different FMDV
isolates similar to those of the structural proteins (Carril-
lo et al., 2005).
Determination of antigenic and genetic profiles of
FMDV strains is important for epidemiological studies
and for the selection of the most appropriate vaccine
strains for a region where vaccination is practised. For
the purpose of epidemiological studies, molecular infor-
mation of isolates at regional level, including all neigh-
bouring countries, should make disease tracing more
effective (Samuel and Knowles, 2001; Domingo et al.,
2003; König et al., 2007). Continued monitoring of newly
emergent strains is necessary to perform vaccine-matching
studies to support the efficacy of actual vaccine formula-
tions (Knowles and Samuel, 2003; Paton et al., 2009).
Some FMDV strains have a pronounced predilection
for one livestock species or another. For instance, the
Hong Kong topotype of type O is well adapted to pigs, to
the extent that it has only once been isolated from a spe-
cies other than pig, and it was in a bovine (Kitching,
2002b); the Cathay topotype of serotype O, including the
Taiwan 1997 outbreak strain, is adapted to and highly
virulent in pigs, but attenuated in cattle (Samuel and
Knowles, 2001).
Susceptible Species
All members of the order Artiodactyla (cloven-hooved
mammals) can be infected by FMDV. Each species varies
in its susceptibility to infection and clinical disease, as
well as in its ability to transmit the virus to other animals
(Lubroth et al., 2006; Rovid Spickler et al., 2010). Other
susceptible species to infection are hedgehogs (Insectivo-
ra), tapirs (Perissodactyla), elephants (Proboscidea), bears
(Carnivora), although they have not been proved to be of
importance in the epidemiology of the disease.
Cattle are usually the most frequently involved in epi-
demics, and play an important role in the maintenance of
the FMDV as the status of persistent infected animal
occurs in high proportion of individuals from this species
(Kitching, 2002a; Sutmoller and Casas Olascoaga, 2002).
Small ruminants may be naturally infected; however, they
show very few or no clinical signs, and persistent infec-
tion is less frequent and of shorter duration than in cattle
(Kitching and Hughes, 2002). Although pigs are highly
susceptible to FMDV, there is no evidence that they may
become carriers (Kitching and Alexandersen, 2002;
Sutmoller and Casas Olascoaga, 2002; Kitching et al.,
2005; Lubroth et al., 2006). Other species, such as llamas,
alpacas and camels, can be infected experimentally, but
do not appear to be very susceptible. Deer, buffalos and
at least 70 species of wild animals may be infected by
FMDV (Rovid Spickler et al., 2010).
Transmission
An FMD outbreak starts when one or more animals
become infected as a consequence of the exposition of a
susceptible population to the FMDV. Once infection is
established in a limited population, such as a pig farm or
other type of herd, the within-farm spreading of the
FMDV begins, through animal-to-animal transmission.
Excretion of the virus can begin up to 4 days before the
onset of clinical signs. This is of great epidemiological sig-
nificance. The agent is excreted in large quantities in
expired air, in all secretions and excretions and from
ruptured vesicles. Pigs may liberate vast quantities of
airborne virus in their expired breath, about 3000 times as
much as cattle (Geering and Lubroth, 2002). Active
viraemia and virus excretion start during incubation period
(Quan et al., 2004); however, the maximum excretion of
virus coincides with the development of clinical disease and
lesions on the snout, tongue and feet, and declines over the
following 3–5 days as the antibody response develops.
Transmission by direct contact between infected and
susceptible animals can be very rapid, and many routes of
viral entry may be involved, such as aerosol, oral, mucosal
and even through damaged epithelium. The respiratory
route is likely to be the most usual portal of entry for
pigs, even if they may require as much as 600 times more
than the exposure to aerosol virus required by a bovine or
an ovine, to cause infection. On the other hand, pigs are
much more susceptible to infection by the oral route than
ruminants (Kitching and Alexandersen, 2002; Grubman
and Baxt, 2004; Paton et al., 2010). Unlike ruminants that
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have recovered from FMD infection, pigs do not become
carriers, and there is no evidence of viral ribonucleic acid
persisting in infected pigs after 3 or 4 weeks of becoming
infected (Kitching and Alexandersen, 2002; Lubroth et al.,
2006).
The next step in the development of an FMD epidemic,
after the establishment of the infection in a farm, is the
between-farms spreading. The virus may spread from an
infected premise to susceptible premises through different
ways, among which the most relevant are: by movement
of infected animals, by direct contact with animals from
neighbouring premises, by movement of infected animal
products, such as meat and offal used as unprocessed
waste food for pigs or milk for calves, by mechanical
transmission, e.g. milking machines, vehicles, tools and
people, and aerogenous transmission by wind (Donaldson
et al., 2001; Oleksiewicz et al., 2001; Donaldson and Alex-
andersen, 2002; Alexandersen et al., 2003; Grubman and
Baxt, 2004). Probably, the most often spread of FMDV is
associated with the movement of infected animals which
excrete virus, and then, other animals, especially rumi-
nants, which are usually infected via inhalation of infec-
tious droplets (Alexandersen et al., 2003).
An additional method is spread by the wind, most
often from pigs to cattle or other ruminants (Alexander-
sen et al., 2003). This is because pigs excrete high concen-
trations of virus in their breath, but are relatively
resistant to airborne infection, while cattle and other
ruminants excrete fewer viruses in their breath, but are
highly sensitive to infection by the airborne route (Don-
aldson et al., 2001; Oleksiewicz et al., 2001; Grubman and
Baxt, 2004). Airborne virus excretion reaches maximum
values with the appearance of vesicular lesions and occurs
within the phase of viraemia (Donaldson and Alexander-
sen, 2003; Kitching et al., 2005). However, virus excretion
starts during the incubation period, before the first clini-
cal signs are evident, increasing significantly the risk of
virus spreading. This situation is particularly important in
pigs (Orsel et al., 2009). In pigs experimentally infected
with two different types of FMDV (O and C) at two chal-
lenging doses per virus, it was shown that for both virus
strains and initial doses of inoculum, airborne virus was
detected over a 3-day period and commenced either cur-
rently with or 1 day before the detection of clinical signs
(Gloster et al., 2008). Coincident results were found in
another study in which pigs were inoculated with type O
FMDV only (Amaral Doel et al., 2009).
If the FMD epidemic develops in a country or a zone,
the following step would be the between-countries trans-
mission. Illegal activities, such as the import of infected
meat and feeding to pigs of non-heat treated swill, or
the illegal transboundary movement of animals, have
often been attributed to introductions of FMD into
non-infected countries. Recent examples are: (i) the
Pan-Asia type O outbreak in South Africa in 2000 on a
pig farm where swill coming from ships was given as food
(Sutmoller et al., 2003; Kitching et al., 2005); (ii) the
involvement of a swill-fed pig unit in the spread of FMD
during the Pan-Asia type O outbreak in the UK in 2001
(Sutmoller et al., 2003; Kitching et al., 2005; Paton et al.,
2009); (iii) the type O outbreak in Uruguay, near the bor-
der with Brazil, caused by the feeding of contraband
slaughterhouse offal to pigs living in close contact to cat-
tle (Sutmoller et al., 2003); (iv) the Pan-Asia type O
FMD epidemic in South Korea in 2002, where 15 of 16
outbreaks were detected in piggeries (Yoon et al., 2006).
Imported straw was also assumed to be the source of
FMD in Korea in 2000 (Shin et al., 2003) and might also
have been the source of the FMD outbreak in Japan in
the spring of 2000 (Sugiura et al., 2001).
Clinical Signs and Lesions
Incubation period in natural conditions varies according
to virus strain, the exposure dose and the route of entry.
It may range from 24 h to a maximum of 11 days (Kit-
ching and Alexandersen, 2002; Quan et al., 2004).
Early signs of FMD in pigs are characterized by fever,
inappetence and reluctance to move. Usually, the more
severe lesions occur in the feet, starting by lameness and
blanching of the skin around the coronary bands. Vesicles
develop on the coronary band, heel and interdigital space.
Lesions at other sites are less frequent and less severe.
Sometimes, vesicles may be found on the snout or the
udder, being relatively uncommon on the tongue. Adult
pig recovery depends on the severity of lesions, some of
them may suffer chronic lameness. Fattening pigs will
require a longer time to reach their slaughter weight.
Young pigs up to 14 weeks may die suddenly due to heart
failure; piglets are particularly susceptible. In some herds,
piglet mortality is the first sign of the disease (Geering
and Lubroth, 2002; Kitching and Alexandersen, 2002;
Lubroth et al., 2006; Rovid Spickler et al., 2010).
The incidence of the disease in non-immunized popu-
lations can be as high as 100%. Mortality rate in adult
animals is usually negligible, but, as previously men-
tioned, it can be extremely high in suckling piglets (Lu-
broth et al., 2006; Rovid Spickler et al., 2010).
Diagnosis
In farms presenting high mortality of piglets and a signifi-
cant proportion of pigs showing lameness, fever and
vesicular lesions, FMD should be strongly suspected.
Actions should be taken immediately to secure a defini-
tive diagnosis and prevent further spread on the agent. It
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must also be stressed that, when a vesicular disease in
pigs (or other species) is detected, the practitioner should
immediately contact the official veterinary authorities to
conduct a thorough epidemiological evaluation of the
incident and collect the appropriate samples for proper
laboratory submission (Lubroth et al., 2006).
In the laboratory, FMD can be diagnosed by identifica-
tion of the agent or by serological tests. The main meth-
ods and procedures for these studies are well described in
the Chapter 2.1.5. of the OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests
and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2010 (version
adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates of the OIE
in May 2009) (OIE, 2011a).
For identification of FMDV, different type of samples
can be used, according to the laboratory method to be
applied: virus isolation or RT-PCR: epithelium, oesopha-
geal-pharyngeal (OP) samples and serum; ELISA CF and
the lateral flow device: epithelial suspensions, vesicular
fluids or cell-culture supernatants.
Serological tests for FMD are performed in support of
four main purposes namely:
1 To certify individual animals prior to import or export
(i.e. for trade);
2 To confirm suspected cases of FMD;
3 To substantiate absence of infection;
4 To prove the efficacy of vaccination.
Pigs may be affected by other vesicular diseases, which
are clinically indistinguishable from FMD. Thus, labora-
tory diagnosis of any suspected FMD case in pigs is there-
fore a matter of urgency. Other pig vesicular diseases are:
Vesicular stomatitis (VS): it is a viral disease that pri-
marily affects cattle, horses and swine, and occasionally
sheep, goats, llamas, and alpacas. Two distinct immuno-
logical classes of VS virus have been recognized: New Jer-
sey and Indiana. It is endemic in northern parts of South
America and all Central America, being less frequent in
USA. It is not present in other continents (Lubroth et al.,
2006; OIE, 2011b).
Swine vesicular disease (SVD): it does not affect other
species. It can be a subclinical, mild or severe vesicular
condition depending on the strain of virus involved, the
route and dose of infection, and the husbandry conditions
under which the pigs are kept (Lubroth et al., 2006).
Recent outbreaks of SVD have been characterized by less
severe or no clinical signs; infection has been detected
when samples are tested for a serosurveillance programme
or for export certification. The last immediate notification
reported to OIE from a European country was from Por-
tugal in 2007: one farm was affected, with a population of
1800 pigs. All of them were eliminated by stamping out.
The origin of the outbreak remains unknown (OIE-WA-
HID, 2011). The disease was present in the Southern
parts of Italy until 2005 (Bellini et al., 2007).
Vesicular exanthema (VES): it does not affect other
species than pig. It originated in California, and became
widespread in the USA during the 1950s, but the vigorous
campaign to eradicate the disease was successful. In 1959,
the USA was declared free of VES, and the disease was
designated a foreign animal disease. It has never been
reported as a natural infection of pigs in any other part
of the world (Merck & Co. Inc, 2008).
Measures of Control
In scenarios with recent introduction of FMDV into a
fully susceptible population, the number of expected sec-
ondary cases due to contact with the primary case/s will
depend on the basic reproductive ratio (R0). This is the
expected number of new infectious individuals produced
by one infectious individual during its period of infec-
tiousness in a population that is completely susceptible
(Halloran, 1998). R0 depends on (i) the infectiousness of
the agent for the specific host; (ii) the contact rate, or
number of effective contacts between infectious and sus-
ceptible animals per time period; and (iii) the duration of
the infectious period for the specific host. The contact
rate is the most variable factor affecting R0, and is
expected to vary among herd types with the same species
of animals, depending on management differences such as
stocking density, within-herd movements and nature of
physical facilities (Thurmond, 2003).
What is said for R0 is valid only in fully susceptible
populations. In endemic situations, where a given propor-
tion of individuals are immunized, the expected number
of new cases produced by an infected animal is less than
R0 and it is called the effective reproductive number (R).
It depends on R0 and on the proportion of susceptible
individuals in the population (Halloran, 1998). Both R0
and R can be referred to transmission either among
animals within a herd or among herds in a region or
country. The latter estimates the number of new herds
that will become infected as a result of transmission from
an infected herd (Estrada et al., 2008).
Both R0 and R are estimated by calculations made from
data obtained from different sources, such as real epidem-
ics, experimental studies or simulation models. For
instance, in an experimental study, R0 was estimated for
the pre-clinical period (incubation period) in two groups
of piglets challenged with FMDV type O, non-vaccinated
and vaccinated. The observed values were 13.2 and 1.26
respectively. This means that the introduction of FMDV
in a pig farm may result in spreading to a larger number
of animals during the incubation period, which could
imply that, during this time, the herd is already infectious
to other herds (Orsel et al., 2009). From the 2001 FMD
epidemic in the UK, R0 was estimated to be 2.99 at the
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beginning of the epidemic, before the movement ban was
implemented, but when infectious cases linked to markets
were removed from the calculation, the estimate fell to
1.95, revealing the substantial effect of the markets in dis-
seminating infection. After implementation of the ban,
transmission of FMD was predominantly local, with esti-
mates of R falling, shortly after, to about 1.5 (Matthews
and Woolhouse, 2005). In a different scenario, R for
between-herd transmission was estimated in an FMD out-
break that took place in Peru in 2004, where a value of 5.3
was observed at the beginning of the epidemic, and
progressively declined to values below 1 after 3 weeks of
intervention (Estrada et al., 2008). A more recent example
is the 2010 FMD epidemic in Japan, where R for between-
herd transmission was highly variable along the 50 first
days of the epidemic, ranging from 2 to 10. A significant
decline of R values was observed from day 50 after the
beginning of the infection (Nishiura and Omori, 2010).
In both endemic areas and areas that suffered recent
reintroduction of FMDV, the control measures have the
objective of reducing R to values below 1. For FMD, as
well as for any other transmissible disease, those measures
include three possible and independent strategies:
1. Eliminating sources of infection: to accomplish this
objective, the sources of infection should be first identi-
fied. The main sources of infection are infected animals.
Other sources are contaminated premises, tools, vehicles,
wild animals, etc. For the identification of these sources,
epidemiological surveillance programmes have to be
implemented by the official veterinary services. Epidemio-
logical surveillance is an active, ongoing, formal and sys-
tematic process aimed at early detection of a specific
disease or agent in a population or early prediction of
elevated risk of a population acquiring an infectious dis-
ease, with a pre-specified action that would follow the
detection of disease (Thurmond, 2003). This definition is
in agreement with that from other authors (Toma et al.,
1999; Salman, 2003; OIE, 2011c). Passive and active sur-
veillance, as defined in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health
Code, differ in methodology, but have both the same
aim, demonstrating the absence of disease or infection,
determining the occurrence or distribution of disease or
infection, as well as detecting, as early as possible, exotic
or emerging diseases (OIE, 2011c).
Surveillance on FMD requires at least the fulfilling of
the following items:
1 Participation of all actors involved in the animal pro-
duction chain. They must be aware of FMD clinical
signs and the procedures for its notification. This
implies a great deal of communication and continuous
education;
2 Training of members of the official veterinary services
as regards the notifications of vesicular diseases. A
programme of continuous education of staff, not only
on aspects regarding the disease but also on legal and
regulatory frame, is crucial. Simulation exercises
should be regularly performed;
3 Having a specialist FMD diagnosis team; adequate
knowledge of the susceptible population: number of
farms and animals per species and production system,
size of herds, geographical distribution of farms, dis-
tance between them, patterns of animal movements;
4 Knowledge of the location of places of animal concentra-
tion, such as live markets, slaughterhouses and others;
5 Access to laboratory diagnostic capabilities for rapid
and certain diagnosis;
6 Access to a network of international reference labora-
tories.
Passive surveillance is the strategy of choice for early
detection; however, implementation of a highly sensible
system requires a great effort on the part of the veterinary
authorities. Obviously, non-official veterinary service is
able to regularly and frequently check for vesicular syn-
dromes in all susceptible animals in a population. How-
ever, on the other hand, producers, private veterinarians,
markets and slaughterhouse workers have access to the
totality of the herd and may detect from the beginning
any vesicular syndrome. The system may work if all these
actors are involved in a network, are well informed about
the clinical signs of FMD and are aware of the impor-
tance of prompt notification to official authorities (Sal-
man, 2003; Dufour and Hendrikx, 2009). The procedures
for notifications must be clearly communicated to all of
them, as well as the consequences. The role of official vet-
erinary services in passive surveillance concerns commu-
nication for the motivation of actors, and of course, their
capacity to rapidly respond to notifications such as visit
to the affected premises, clinical checks, collection of epi-
demiological data, sampling and access to laboratory for
confirmation or rejection of the suspicion. Active surveil-
lance may not be as useful as passive surveillance in ende-
mic or re-emerging scenarios if an early detection of
FMD is the main aim of surveillance (Kitching et al.,
2005).
Given that FMD is a typical Transboundary Animal
Disease, the surveillance strategy should take into account
the area in which it will be implemented, either at the
national level or at the regional level, the latter option
being clearly the preferred (Rweyemamu et al., 2008).
However, the implementation of this type of regional
actions, where many countries are involved, normally pre-
sents serious difficulties of many orders, particularly in
developing countries, where FMD is unfortunately more
frequent.
The time to detect, report and confirm FMD is one of
the most important measures of the effectiveness of a
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surveillance system (Thurmond, 2003). In this sense, it
was estimated that if the national movement ban in the
2001 FMD epidemic in the UK had been imposed 2 days
earlier, the final size of the epidemic would have been
reduced to 48% of its observed size (Matthews and
Woolhouse, 2005). By modelling the 2002 FMD epidemic
in South Korea, it was determined that initiating actions
5 days earlier would produce less than half of the actual
observed infected premises (Yoon et al., 2006).
Once the source of infection has been identified, it has
to be eliminated. This is the second stage, and can be per-
formed by application of different means, such as stamp-
ing out, slaughtering, disinfection, bio-containment
measures and even vaccination. The objective of stamping
out is to stop the production of virus in livestock, so that
any aerosol or local spread of infection is kept to a mini-
mum. This means that animals in infected premises
should be slaughtered as soon as possible after the disease
is confirmed (Mouat, 2003). The effect of stamping out is
a reduction of R for between-herd transmission (Nishiura
and Omori, 2010).
Stamping out was the main strategy used by UK
authorities to control the 2001 FMD epidemic. Following
confirmation of the disease, all the infected animals and
the dangerous contacts had to be slaughtered within 24 h,
and in some areas, all animals within a 3 km radius. By
the end of the epidemic about 1.3 million animals were
slaughtered from infected/confirmed premises and more
than 2.7 million animals from dangerous contact pre-
mises. Other measures of bio-containment were imposed,
such as disinfection of facilities, vehicles, clothing and
footwear (Mouat, 2003; Kitching et al., 2005). At the same
time, a similar modality was implemented by the French
authorities. When the UK informed them about the dis-
covery of FMD outbreaks, a preventive culling policy
(slaughter, destruction and disinfestations) was immedi-
ately implemented on 25 000 imported animals as well as
on 30 000 animals from susceptible species that had been
in contact with the imported ones (Chmitelin, 2003).
2. Interrupting contact between infected and susceptible
individuals: movement interdictions, sanitary barriers,
zoning, bio-exclusion measures. As stated above, R
depends on the infectiousness of the agent, the duration
of the infectious period and the contact rate. The first
one depends on the nature of the agent, and usually it
cannot be modified. The duration of the infectious period
could be reduced at an individual level by certain treat-
ments (e.g. vaccination increases resistance to infection,
but if infected, animals excrete less virus for shorter peri-
ods of time), and at the farm level through the elimina-
tion of the infectious source. The contact rate is directly
affected by population density and movement of animals,
both highly related to the productive system.
At the farm level, the direct contact between animals is
usually difficult to avoid. At the beginning of an out-
break, when animals still do not show clinical signs of the
disease, during the incubation period, there is no reason
to interrupt contact. Once the first case is diagnosed,
measures to reduce contact can be put in place, depend-
ing on the producing system and facilities. Intensive sys-
tems with isolated compartments may help in this sense,
as well as all classical measures of bio-containment and
biosecurity.
The results of two experimental studies may be the best
example of the magnitude of the effect of reducing contact
between infective and susceptible animals. In one study,
five infected pigs with FMDV type O were placed in a
central pen, surrounded by four pens with one susceptible
pig each, at a distance of 40–70 cm. The experiment was
replicated twice, and none of the susceptible pigs became
infected, confirming that pigs are relatively resistant to
aerosol exposure. A similar experiment was performed,
but this time the four pens with the susceptible pigs were
in direct contact with the central pen. Pen walls were
made of solid wood, leaving narrow openings up to 1 cm
at the corners and near the floor. In this instance, four of
eight pigs became infected, and R was estimated at 1.1. As
the within-pen R0 had been previously estimated as 23
new infections per infected pig, so one pen wall between
adjacent pens reduced transmission by 20-fold (van Roer-
mund et al., 2010). In other experimental study, compar-
ing dynamics of infection with FMDV type O in pigs kept
separate from each other and in pigs housed in groups, it
was shown that the increase in the number of infected
pigs housed together had the effect of increasing the inter-
action between animals and the activity of individual pigs,
which had the effect of shortening the time to onset of
clinical signs (Quan et al., 2004).
Movement of animals or materials susceptible to be
contaminated out of infected premises is probably the
most important way for spreading of FMDV (Geering
and Lubroth, 2002; Kitching, 2002a). When an infected
animal is moved, the direct and indirect contact that
arises from mixing increases the risk of introducing the
disease into populations previously free of it (León et al.,
2006). For this reason, the first step in any control pro-
gramme must be an absolute standstill of all livestock
movement in the infected area (Sutmoller et al., 2003;
Kitching et al., 2005). The effect of movement restriction
is a reduction in the value of R.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of new
cases of FMD that are expected to occur as a consequence
of introducing an infected animal in a 1000 fully suscepti-
ble pig herd, as a function of five different levels of effec-
tive contact rate: 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2. The calculations were
performed using the Reed and Frost formula. When the
E. A. León Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Pigs
ª 2012 Blackwell Verlag GmbH • Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 59 (Suppl. 1) (2012) 36–49 41
number of cases is increasing, the value of R is >1, mean-
ing that one case generates, on average, more than one
new case. On the other hand, when the number of cases
decreases, R is below 1, meaning that each case produces
on average <1 new case. The results are very simplistic, as
the method assumes that: (i) the probability of receiving
an effective contact is the same for all individuals in the
population; (ii) no action is taken to stop contacts. How-
ever, it is a clear way of illustrating the effect of contact.
The introduction on time period 0 of an infected animal
in a population with a contact rate of 10 will produce a
rapid spreading of the infection, with the peak of cases
on time period 3 and the totality of individuals infected
by the end of time period 5. In a scenario with a more
moderate contact rate, for instance six, the peak of the
curve will take place later on, on time period 4, and all
animals will become infected at time period 6. With a
contact rate of two the peak will occur at time period 9
and transmission of disease will stop at time period 18,
resulting in 20% of animals that did not suffer infection.
A similar response to contact rate could be expected
for spreading between farms: the lower the contact
between farms (direct or indirect), the smaller the proba-
bility of FMDV spreading will be. The effect of applying
movement restrictions on the expected number of out-
breaks as well as the duration of an FMD epidemic in
Dutch conditions was estimated through a simulation
modelling. The results indicated that a significant reduc-
tion of both parameters occurred in low animal density
areas, whereas the effect was less significant in high den-
sity areas, where local spread can still transport the virus
outside the affected premises (Velthuis and Mourits,
2007). The implementation of sanitary barriers between
countries or zones within countries is another way of
interrupting undesirable contact.
3. Decreasing proportion of susceptible animals: vaccina-
tion programmes. Vaccination against FMDV is another
of the strategies that can be implemented to control the
disease. Certainly, it is the most controversial one, as the
time required to regain the free status strongly depends
on it. Most current FMD vaccines are formulated using
inactivated viral antigen produced in baby hamster kidney
cells. The FMDV is fully virulent and inactivated with
binary ethylenimine. The antigen must be then purified
before vaccine formulation. Adjuvants commonly used
include oil-in-water emulsions or aluminium hydroxide/
saponin emulsions (McVey and Shi, 2010).
A distinction between conventional and emergency
vaccines has to be made: emergency vaccines are of
higher potency, usually six or more protective dose 50,
having the effect of inducing rapid protective immunity
and wider antigenic coverage within FMDV serotypes.
These vaccines are usually elaborated with a higher
antigen load per dose than conventional ones (Barnett
and Carabin, 2002; Barnett et al., 2002). The onset of
immunity is 3–4 days in cattle and sheep, but only
10 days after inoculation, clinical protection is broadly
insured, provided there is optimal quality of the vac-
cine. These periods are longer in pigs; 3 weeks appear
to be a minimum delay for some authors (Toma et al.,
2002), while others have obtained effective within-pen
protection between 7 and 14 days after vaccination
(Eblé et al., 2004).
The efficacy of vaccination is affected by the lack of
cross-protection between serotypes, as well as incomplete
protection between some subtypes (Mattion et al., 2004).
Additionally, new variant viruses are emerging periodi-
cally. For these reasons, in case of outbreak, the immedi-
ate requirement is to detect the circulating virus serotype,
which is generally achieved by antigenic-typing ELISA or
by genetic typing (sequencing of the VP1 gene). Once the
serotype of the virus in established, vaccine-matching
assays have to be carried out in order to select a suitable
vaccine strain (Parida, 2009).
The probability of stopping FMDV spreading by vacci-
nation depends on many factors, among which the most
relevant are the efficacy of the vaccine (proportion of vac-
cinated animals that are protected), the time interval
between the beginning of the outbreak and the beginning
of vaccination, and the proportion of vaccinated animals
(Keelling et al., 2003).
Countries or areas free from the disease may imple-
ment emergency vaccination as a complement for the
previous two strategies. The broadest sense of emergency
vaccination is the use of vaccines to control an outbreak
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the number of FMD cases in a 1000 fully suscep-
tible pigs herd, after introduction of an infected animal. Each curve
represents the expected number of cases as a function of the effective
contact rate. Calculations were performed according to Reed-Frost
model.
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disease, in which routine prophylactic vaccination is not
practised (Cox and Barnett, 2009).
Emergency vaccination may be implemented in differ-
ent manners. For instance, ring vaccination around iden-
tified infected premises, with elimination of vaccinated
animals once the outbreak is controlled, and the absence
of virus circulation is demonstrated by serological surveil-
lance. Ring vaccination may also be applied, without
elimination of vaccinated animals (Parida, 2009).
Ring vaccination does not significantly reduce the risk
of FMDV between premises, compared with the strategy
of elimination of infected and contact animals by stamp-
ing out. But in those scenarios where stamping out can-
not be applied, ring vaccination is the best method for
reducing virus circulation (Toma et al., 2002). When the
number or distribution of outbreaks exceeds the expecta-
tions, the strategy of blanket vaccination could be another
option.
It is important to remark that current vaccines have
the ability to protect animals (provided matching between
vaccine and field strains and time to induce immunity)
against clinical signs of FMD, but they cannot fully pro-
tect against infection (even if virus transmission is signifi-
cantly reduced, it is not completely interrupted). This
means that the control of an epidemic by vaccination
only is unlikely, and the other strategies have to be simul-
taneously implemented (Barnett and Carabin, 2002).
Choosing the Most Convenient Strategy
None of the three strategies described is perfect. For that
reason, the simultaneous implementation of more than
one is convenient. The choice of the applicable strategies
depends on many aspects, among which the epidemiolog-
ical situation, access to economic resources and need to
recover status are probably the most relevant.
In free countries or zones where vaccination in not
practised, the elimination of the infection sources and the
interruption of the contact between infected and suscepti-
ble individuals are the two basic strategies normally
implemented to control a re-emergence of FMD. Such
conditions allow the recovering of the free status in the
least possible time, which is 3 months after the elimina-
tion of the last case, provided that serological surveillance
is applied and results demonstrate the absence of virus
circulation. Recovering the status in the shortest time is
of great importance for exporting countries; therefore, it
is the main reason why vaccination is not applied. In cer-
tain cases, the two strategies are complemented with
emergency vaccination of animals at risk, for instance,
when a great number of premises are infected and/or the
affected area becomes too extended. The application of
the three strategies simultaneously may reduce the num-
ber of eliminated animals, reducing the global costs of
eradication. If vaccination is followed by the slaughtering
of all vaccinated animals, the free status may be recovered
3 months after elimination of all vaccinated animals, pro-
vided that serological surveillance is applied and results
demonstrate the absence of virus circulation. If vaccina-
tion is not followed by the slaughtering of all vaccinated
animals, the recovering of the free status takes longer,
6 months after the last case or the last vaccination, pro-
vided that a serological survey based on the detection of
antibodies to non-structural proteins of FMDV demon-
strates the absence of infection in the remaining vacci-
nated population. Free countries that cannot afford
compensation to producers associated to sanitary sacrifice
of animals might reject the strategy of stamping out, and
implement the interruption of the contact between
infected and susceptible individuals and the emergency
vaccination. In such case, the recovery of the free status
would require 1 year, with demonstration of non-circula-
tion of FMDV.
In countries or zones where vaccination is practised,
recovery of free status takes 6 months after the elimination
of the last case, if a stamping-out policy, emergency vacci-
nation and serological surveillance are applied. In the case
where a stamping-out policy is not applied, the required
period is 18 months, provided that emergency vaccination
and serological surveillance are properly performed.
Due to the high transmissibility of FMDV, the control
measures taken in endemic areas will have little probabil-
ity of success if they are taken individually by a country
or area. The control policies have to be undertaken at a
regional basis. For that, strong collaboration and trans-
parency between parts are needed.
Measures of Prevention
In FMD-free areas or countries, import control including
quarantine, is the first line of defence. Because of the
infectious nature of FMD, often a country’s strategy is
best served by working in and for a regional programme
(Geering and Lubroth, 2002; Rweyemamu et al., 2008).
The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Chapter 8.5 on
FMD, provides guidelines for the safe importation of live
animals, meat and other animal products, from FMD-free
and infected countries and zones (OIE, 2011d).
An important issue to be taken into consideration is
the quality of the Official Veterinary Services of the
exporting country, mainly in those topics affecting trans-
parency (authority and capability to notify the OIE their
status and other relevant matters pursuant to the estab-
lished procedures), international certification (authority
and capability to certify animals, animal products, services
and processes under their mandate, in accordance with
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national legislation and regulations, and international
standards) and even more important, epidemiological
surveillance (authority and capability to determine, verify
and report on the sanitary status of the animal popula-
tion under their mandate) (OIE-PVS, 2010).
A distinction between the risk of FMDV entry via
importation of an animal product and the risk of an FMD
outbreak resulting from such event must be made. It is
quite likely that very small quantities of FMDV are occa-
sionally imported into FMD-free countries, but outbreaks
as a result of this are rare. For an outbreak to occur, a suf-
ficient quantity of infectious virus must contact a suscepti-
ble animal and initiate infection. In that sense, pigs are at
greater risk from contaminated products than sheep or
cattle, as they may consume waste food and the infectious
oral dose is lower for pigs than ruminants (Ryan et al.,
2008). Concerning importation of live animals, the
quarantine policy should include pre-export testing and
quarantine, animal heath certification and any necessary
post-arrival inspection testing and quarantine. These poli-
cies should be based on the results of risk analyses.
Importation of animal products may be of greater risk
than live animals, as diagnostic test or quarantine mea-
sures are of more restricted use. Regarding bovine meat,
the acidification of the skeletal muscle that take place
during carcass maturation is normally sufficient to inacti-
vate all FMDV in this tissue, even when animals are killed
at the height of viraemia. The problem is the existence of
bone marrow or lymph node tissues in the meat, which is
regarded as a significant risk factor (Ryan et al., 2008;
Thomson et al., 2009; Paton et al., 2010). Other tissues
and organs that may harbour FMDV do not undergo
acidification and here, the virus can survive the matura-
tion process and subsequent low-temperature storage.
These include blood, heads and viscera.
There may be considerable variation between pigs in
the time taken for the pH of the latissimus dorsi muscle
to fall from 6.5 to a final pH of 5.5 at 37C (150–
400 min). In commercial production, the pH of pork sel-
dom falls below 5.7. Thus, a reduction of pH below 6 is
not a reliable feature for commercial pork meat. Concern-
ing pig products, FMDV survival is even more variable,
depending on the temperature of processing and storage,
pH, time of storage, water activity, moisture protein ratio,
salinity and any additives that may be included. The
interaction of these factors with the enzymatic proteolysis,
which occurs in many products determines the extent of
FMDV inactivation (Ryan et al., 2008).
In free countries or zones where the risk of FMDV
reintroduction is not negligible, for instance many South
American countries, mass and compulsory vaccination
programmes may be applied to complement the other
preventive measures.
World Epidemiological Situation
At present, OIE has 178 member countries. According to
their FMD status, they are recognized as:
1 Free country where vaccination is not practised (n: 65;
36.5%);
2 Free country where vaccination is practised (n: 1;
0.6%);
3 Country with an FMD-free zone where vaccination is
not practised (n: 10; 5.6%);
4 Country with an FMD-free zone where vaccination is
practised (n: 6; 3.4%).
Some countries have both types of zones. Countries
not classified in any of these categories are either endemic
or are suffering from the recent re-emerging of the dis-
ease (n: 100; 56.2%). These figures reflect the extensive
Fig. 2. Countries with OIE status of FMD free, where vaccination is practised and not practised, and countries having FMD -free zones where vac-
cination is practised and not practised (Source: OIE).
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distribution that the disease has in the world. Actually,
there are only three regions free of it: North & Central
America plus Caribbean, Europe and Oceania (Fig. 2).
From January 2006 to May 2011, a total 1,795 out-
breaks of FMD were notified to OIE, affecting 42 coun-
tries from four continents. A description of infected
animals according to different parameters is presented in
Table 1 (OIE-WAHID, 2011). These records are the
result of immediate notifications, meaning that cases
occurring in endemic countries or zones are not
included. Annual distribution of countries that notified
FMD to OIE from 2006 to 2010, including all species,
can be observed in Fig. 3. In the last years, reported
cases have shown a strong concentration in four zones
namely, Southern and North-western Africa, Middle East
and Eastern Asia.
The outbreaks were due to six FMDV serotypes: A, O,
Asia1, SAT1, SAT2 and SAT3. Nearly 1100 outbreaks
involved pigs, in which more than 25 000 pigs were
directly affected by the disease, producing more than
Table 1. Data of 1795 FMD outbreaks notified to OIE from January









1 634 922 119 222 708 731 1303 3290
Diseased
animals
48 334 28 525 25 973 311 1840
Deaths 753 2702 17 189 32 772
Destroyed 90 609 25 420 629 533 123 1248
Slaughtered 6741 662 261 359 0
Fig. 3. Countries that notified FMD to OIE from 2006 to 2010, all species included (Source: OIE-WAHID).
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17 000 deaths, representing about 66% of lethality. The
FMDV serotype that affected pigs more frequently was O,
identified in more than 88% of outbreaks, followed by
Asia1, which was isolated in 9% of outbreaks.
The role of pigs in the recent FMD epidemics has been
significant, mainly in countries from Eastern Asia. Pigs
were involved in 7 of 38 immediate notifications made to
OIE from January 2010 to May 2011, affecting China,
Chinese Taipei, North Korea, South Korea and Hong
Kong. In the epidemic that took place in Miyazaki, Japan,
between April and July 2010, 292 farms were affected by
FMD, 84 of them were pig herds, representing a cumula-
tive herd incidence of 36.4%, when the same value for
cattle was 8.5% (Nishiura and Omori, 2010). In the 2001
FMD epidemic in the UK, pigs also played a significant
role, as three of the first five reported outbreaks con-
tained pigs (Donaldson and Alexandersen, 2003).
As a consequence of these outbreaks, near 630 000 pigs
were killed. These are the direct costs of the disease. Eco-
nomic losses in terms of international trade interruption,
costs of control measures and many other indirect costs
should be added to the direct costs to have a rough esti-
mation of general losses (James and Rushton, 2002;
Thompson et al., 2002; Perry and Randolph, 2003;
Forman et al., 2009).
The knowledge of the current epidemiological situation
of FMD in exporting countries is probably the main
input for risk analysis regarding importation of animals
or animal products. OIE records of notifications are an
extremely valuable source of information for that. How-
ever, even if member countries have accepted their obli-
gation of notifying every FMD event, it is known that a
number of countries with endemic FMD status and sub-
stantial animal populations provide no information on
FMD outbreaks or provide data that are considered a sig-
nificant under-reporting of the true situation. On this
basis, an assessment of world FMD distribution has been
recently carried out, combining official disease informa-
tion with expert opinion and livestock populations. This
study generated maps of prevalence, where the areas of
highest prevalence were China for pigs, India for cattle,
the Near East for small ruminants and the Sahara region
of Africa for small ruminants and cattle (Sumption et al.,
2008).
Conclusion
Probably, the most relevant conclusion from this litera-
ture revision is that FMD is still endemic in more than
half of the countries of the world, and very little progress
has been made in this sense in the last years. Another
dramatic conclusion is that the disease re-emerges in free
countries with certain frequently.
At the same time, a very prolific generation of knowl-
edge is being developed that has been strongly stimulated
as a consequence of some episodes that took place
recently, such as the 2001 and 2007 UK epidemics, and
the re-emergence of the disease in South Korea and
Japan. Enormous progress has been made in the under-
standing of FMDV transmission, as well as in the molecu-
lar epidemiology of the disease. However, gaps in
knowledge still exist. It could be mentioned, among
others, the transmission of FMDV from one country to
another, the predilection of some FMDV strains for
specific species, the high variability of the virus and the
rapid response of vaccines.
But certainly, the very little progress observed in FMD
eradication cannot be attributed to lack of knowledge.
The disease is mainly concentrated in developing coun-
tries having little or no possibility of exporting animals or
animal products. Many of those countries have extreme
reduced budget for Official Veterinary Services, and have
no interest in investing for improving animal health. This
reality leaves geographical clusters where the virus is
endemically maintained, at the time that makes impossi-
ble to undertake the control of the disease at regional
basis.
International efforts should be strengthened to promote
the regional control of the disease. The actions should be
financially supported in high proportion by the countries
that most will benefit with global eradication.
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